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ABSTRACT. This article examines how governance, particularly corruption control and 
politically stability, affects deforestation due to agricultural land expansion. The theoretical 
model shows the importance of the complementarity or substitutability of technology and land 
use in determining the effect of governance on forest cover vis-à-vis agricultural land expansion. 
We estimate a structural empirical model to measure the effect of corruption control and political 
stability on deforestation in developing countries. Political stability has a positive and significant 
effect on forest cover; however, corruption control has a negative and significant effect on forest 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The determinants of deforestation are categorized as direct factors and underlying factors 
of deforestation. Direct factors, such as logging, agricultural land expansion and road building, 
immediately contribute to the conversion of forest land to other land uses while underlying 
factors influence the severity of the direct factors.  Many underlying factors have been analyzed 
such as economic growth (Koop and Tole 1999), political institutions (Nguyen Van and 
Azomahou 2007), exchange rates (Arcand et al. 2008), trade openness (López and Galinato 
2005), poverty (Zwane 2007), population, market forces and property rights (Angelsen 1999). 
  Understanding the effect of governance on economic growth has become a central focus 
in the literature (World Bank 2002). Weak institutions due to corruption, political instability or 
lack of regulations can hinder economic development. Corruption and political instability at the 
national level can impede rural development by reducing public expenditure (Anriquez 2007). 
Corruption also skews policies in favor of rent seeking firms (Bulte and Damania 2008) and 
political instability creates uncertainty that leads to less resource conservation (Deacon and 
Mueller 2004) and a reduction in resource stocks. 
  This article examines the effect of governance, particularly corruption control and 
political stability, on forest cover in developing countries. We develop a theoretical model that 
explains how governance affects deforestation due to agricultural land expansion. We test our 
theoretical results by estimating a structural empirical model to measure the effect of corruption 
control and political stability on deforestation in developing countries through two direct 
channels of deforestation: agricultural land expansion and road building.
1 The theoretical model 
explains the underlying mechanisms by which governance affects deforestation while the 
empirical model provides a measure relating governance and deforestation through the direct   3
channels in the short run and long run. The empirical analysis has important policy implications 
because it measures the immediate and long term importance of controlling corruption and 
correcting political instability on forests and, consequently rural development. 
  We develop a two-stage model where a profit-maximizing representative farmer selects 
the optimal amount of agricultural land to be cleared given the available technology in the 
agricultural sector. Next, given the choice of the representative farmer, the government chooses 
the level of infrastructure development projects in the rural economy. We find that the 
substitutability or complementarity of technology and land use play a significant role in 
determining the effect of corruption control and political stability on agricultural land use and, 
subsequently forest cover.  
We define political stability as a measure of the probability that the government is 
overthrown. This measure of governance enters into our model in two ways. The quality of 
infrastructure is positively correlated with political stability of an economy (Gimenez and Sanau 
2007) and affects the creation and enforcement of laws. The first assumption we make is that 
political stability influences the probability of completing rural infrastructure programs. We also 
assume that political stability affects the cost of land clearing but the relationship depends on the 
stringency of forest protection laws. 
Corruption control enters into our model in two ways. First, corruption increases the cost 
of infrastructure building (Kenny 2006) which affects road building in the rural economy. 
Second, corruption affects the set of technologies available for the farmer in the agricultural 
sector. Bridgman et al. (2007) shows lobby groups have an incentive to block the adoption of 
superior technology in order to maximize rents. Similarly, Bulte et al. (2007) develops a model 
that shows how lobbying by wealthy farmers induces policy makers to select inefficient modes   4
of agricultural production. Thus, we assume an increase in corruption control increases available 
technology in the agricultural sector. Agricultural technology choice significantly determines the 
extent to which deforestation occurs (Angelsen and Kaimowitz 2001). We show how corruption 
could lead to agricultural intensification or extensification depending on the complementarity or 
substitutability of land and technology.   
We complement our theoretical model with an empirical analysis that measures the 
effects of governance on forest cover. Most empirical models that estimate the effect of 
macroeconomic variables on forest cover use a cross-country, reduced form approach (Cropper 
and Griffiths 1994; Shafik 1994; Southgate 1994; Antle and Heidebrink 1995; Deacon 1999; 
Koop and Tole 1999; Barbier and Burgess 1997, 2001).  There are two significant criticisms with 
regard to this approach. First, a reduced form approach does not disentangle the channels by 
which such variables affect deforestation. By not modeling the channels through which 
governance affects deforestation, appropriate policies may not be identified. Second, all cross-
country forest data rely on projected and interpolated data from the Food and Agricultural 
Organization (FAO). Two prominent analysts have concluded that FAO forest cover data is 
unsatisfactory in implementing some types of econometric analysis of deforestation (Angelsen 
and Kaimowitz 1999). 
A number of microstudies that analyze the determinants of deforestation have relied on 
data from local surveys, remote sensing and satellite images (Panayotou and Sungsuwan 1994; 
Chomitz and Thomas 2003; Cropper et al. 2001; López 1997 and 2000). An advantage of these 
types of studies is the strong quality of forest cover data and direct factors data. Unfortunately, 
given the local nature of the data, it is difficult to analyze the effect of macroeconomic variables. 
López and Galinato (2005) were the first to develop a methodology to bridge the link between   5
macroeconomic analyses with estimates from micro studies using four countries. They combine 
the elasticities from their regressions on direct factors of deforestation with parameter estimates 
from microstudies where direct factors are regressors to obtain the total effect of macroeconomic 
variables on forest cover. 
Our study differs from the above-mentioned studies because we account for the effect of 
macroeconomic variables on deforestation through the direct factors of deforestation.  
Furthermore, we extend the empirical methodology of López and Galinato. First, we focus our 
analysis on the effect of two governance indicators: political stability and corruption control, on 
deforestation. Second, we extend the number of countries in our sample by creating a unique 
dataset that isolates the amount of agricultural land encroaching on forest cover. Lastly, we 
measure the short-run and long-run effect of macroeconomic variables on deforestation. This is 
the first study we are aware of that compares the long run and short run effects of underlying 
factors on forest cover. 
  The rest of the article is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the theoretical and 
empirical model. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents the results of the regressions 
and the total effect of macroeconomic variables on deforestation. Section 5 concludes the study. 
II. MODEL 
We present a conceptual framework for the article. Next, we formulate the theoretical 
model which serves as the foundation for the empirical model. 
Conceptual Framework 
Micro studies of deforestation have identified land use patterns as the most important 
source of deforestation (Panayotou and Sungsuwan 1994; Pfaff 1999; López 1997 and 2000; 
Chomitz and Thomas 2003; Cropper, et al. 2001).   Expansion of agriculture and construction of   6
roads into forest areas are the most important direct factors determining deforestation especially 
in Latin America and Asia (Houghton et al. 1991; Rerkasem et al. 2009).  Henceforth, we use the 
term agricultural land expansion and cropland expansion interchangeably. There may be a bi-
causal relationship between agricultural land expansion and road building. Road construction in 
forest regions induces rural population development and land clearing for agricultural purposes.  
Also, agricultural expansion can lead to increased lobbying to develop rural infrastructure. 
Logging has its own dynamics, but initial logging is usually followed by agricultural expansion 
making it difficult to separate the effect of logging from agricultural expansion.   
Figure 1 describes the conceptual framework that we develop to analyze the effects of 
governance on forest cover. Governance and other economy-wide policies are considered 
underlying factors. We focus on two direct factors of deforestation: agricultural land expansion 
and road building. Changes in governance affect agricultural land expansion and road 
infrastructure in the rural sector, which affect forest cover.  There are two blocks of causation. 
Block I shows the effects from the underlying factors on the direct factors of deforestation. We 
present a theoretical model in the next subsection that outlines the mechanisms by which 
political stability and corruption control affect agricultural land expansion and road building. We 
measure the short run and long run effect of the two governance measures on the two direct 
factors of deforestation. Block II shows the effect of direct factors on forest cover. We rely on 
micro studies that estimate the impact of agricultural land expansion and road building on forest 
cover. We measure the total effect of governance on forest cover by combining our original 
regression coefficients and estimates from micro studies.  
 Theoretical Model of Governance, Agricultural Land Expansion and Road Building   7
Our objective in this subsection is not to derive unambiguous comparative static relating 
governance to agricultural land expansion and road building. Instead, we try to explain how 
governance influences these two direct factors of deforestation and derive a model that can be 
estimated empirically. 
We specify an aggregate agricultural production function in the rural economy, 
  (1)  Q = F (Z, K;   A )                       
where Q is agricultural output in the sector, Z is forest land area cleared for agriculture, K is a 
vector of physical inputs in the production of agricultural output and A is a technological 
productivity index. We assume that Q is concave and linearly homogeneous in all inputs.  
  Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the agricultural sector or value added from the 
agricultural sector is defined as the returns to converted land, Z, such that  
(2)  (, ,;) m a x { (, ;) } Gp ZA p FZ A 
K wK w K                      
where G() is agricultural GDP, p is output price and w is a vector of competitive input prices 
associated with K that are determined in the world market. Agricultural GDP is a dual revenue 
function and is concave and increasing in Z (Diewert 1974).   
  Following Chomitz and Gray (1996), we postulate that differences in output prices are 
related to differences in transportation costs. The availability of roads affects market accessibility 
and can, therefore, influence prices. Thus, output prices depend on the amount of roads in the 
agricultural sector, 
(3)   p = p ( R )                           
where R is the length of road networks in the rural sector. Road building is likely to reduce 
transportation distance leading to a decrease in output price (Chomitz and Gray 1996). Thus, we   8
assume output price is decreasing at an increasing rate in the amount of road networks, such that 
pR(R) < 0 and pRR(R) > 0.
2 
The technology productivity index, A, is affected by government policies and the 
corruption control level, 
(4)  A = A(H; )                            
where H is a vector of macroeconomic policies and indicators and  is a measure of corruption 
control within a country. Corruption control is likely to have a positive effect on technology. If a 
coalition of firms lobby the government to prevent adoption of a superior technology by other 
firms in a sector, technological productivity in an economy decreases (Bridgman et al. 2007). 
Thus, technological productivity is non-decreasing in corruption control such that A  0. 
Macroeconomic variables can have varying effects of technological developments depending on 
the specific policy. 
Using (4) and (3) into (2), we derive the agricultural GDP function in the rural sector, 
(5)  G(R,Z,w,H; ) .                          
There are several properties of the agricultural GDP function given our assumption on the effect 
of roads on output prices along with the production function characteristics. First, G() is 
increasing at a decreasing rate in Z which implies that GZ() > 0 and GZZ() < 0, but decreasing at 
an increasing rate in R such that GR() < 0 and GRR() > 0 and the cross partial GZR()<0.  
  Based on our assumptions, the effect of corruption control on the marginal productivity 
of rural roads in the agricultural sector is non-increasing, 
(6)  (,,, ;) 0 RR A GR Z p F A    wH ,                        
where FA is the marginal product of technology and is non-decreasing. In contrast the effect of 
corruption on the marginal productivity of land clearing is ambiguous,   9
(7) ( , , , ; ) ZZ A GR Z p F A     wH ,                         
where FZA is the cross partial derivative of the production function. If FZA is positive (negative), 
land clearing and technology are complements (substitutes) because the marginal product of land 
clearing increases (decreases) as technology is developed. The development of new species of 
soybeans that adapt to tropical climate in Brazil and Bolivia is an example of a new technology 
that complements land use. On the other hand, development of new fertilizers is an example of a 
technology that substitutes land use. 
  Corruption control also has an effect on the cost of road building, r(). Corruption has 
been found to significantly increase the cost of infrastructure investment. Construction firms in 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia report paying an average of 7% of the value of government 
contracts in bribes to win an infrastructure project (Kenny 2006). Thus, raising corruption 
control can reduce the cost of road building such that r  0. 
   We also introduce the effect of political stability on the provision of additional road 
networks in the rural sector as well as the cost of land clearing. Turnover could occur from coup 
attempts or votes of no confidence. If this occurs, infrastructure projects such as road networks 
are likely to be negatively affected (Gimenez and Sanau 2007). We assume that there is a 
probability, , where the current government is not overthrown and a peaceful transition of 
government occurs. If the government is overthrown, it is likely that current government projects 
will be stopped. Hence, we assume that the level of additional road building is zero when the 
current government is overthrown with probability 1-. 
  Political stability could also affect the cost of land clearing, c(). More stable 
governments are likely to continue and enforce policies that govern natural resource 
management. More political stability increases the cost of land clearing if the policies are   10
stringent but the opposite holds if policies are lax. Thus, political stability may increase or 
decrease the cost of land clearing, i.e. cλ > 0 or cλ < 0. 
  The indirect social welfare function of the rest of the rural economy depends on 
macroeconomic variables as well as road networks, 
R(R,H). More road networks are likely to 
increase welfare of the rest of the rural economy. Thus, we assume 
R
R(R,H) > 0 and 

R
RR(R,H) < 0. 
  To derive the effect of corruption control and political stability on land clearing and rural 
road building, we solve a two-stage problem. First, the representative landowner selects optimal 
amount of land clearing to maximize expected net returns from agricultural output given the 
available road networks. Next, the government maximizes expected social welfare by choosing 
the quantity of road networks to be built given the optimal amount of land cleared. 
Demand for Agricultural Land 
The representative producer maximizes expected returns from land net the cost of land 
clearing by choosing the amount of forest land to clear, 
(8)  m a x ( ,,,; )( 1 )( 0 ,,,; ) ( )
P
Z GRZ G Z c Z         wH wH .    
The returns from agricultural land expansion will depend on the ability of the government to 
create roads. When governments are politically stable, there is a probability of  that the 
representative producer receives G(R,Z,w,H;). However, if the government is overthrown, 
infrastructure programs are likely to be stopped thus the representative producer gains 
G(0,Z,w,H;). The first order condition that maximizes the objective function is, 
(9) ( , ) (1 ) (0, ) ( ) 0 ZZ GR G c       .       
Here, the expected marginal productivity of land is equated to the marginal cost of land clearing.  
Solving for Z from (9) yields the demand equation for agricultural cropland,   11
(10)  Z = Z (R,w,H; ,) .                       
The direct effect of corruption and political stability on agricultural land expansion is derived 
using the implicit function theorem on (9). We find the following, 
(11) 
(, ) ( 1 ) ( 0 , )












;                     
(12) 
(, ) ( 0 , )
(, ) ( 1 ) ( 0 , )
ZZ
ZZ ZZ









.                     
The denominator of (11) and (12) are negative to ensure a maximum. We find that the effect of 
corruption control on land clearing is ambiguous and will depend on the substitutability or 
complementarity of land and technology from (7). If land and technology are complements 
(substitutes), increased corruption control could lead to agricultural land extensification 
(intensification) thereby increasing (reducing) the amount of forested land cleared.   
  The effect of political stability on the amount of land cleared is also ambiguous because 
of the ambiguous effect of political stability on the cost of land clearing. If c >0, then more 
political stability leads to less land clearing; however, the results are ambiguous if c < 0. 
Government Provision of Rural Road Networks 
The government optimally chooses the amount of additional road networks in the rural 
economy to maximize expected net returns from the agricultural sector along with expected 
welfare from other sectors in the rural economy given the cost of road infrastructure and the 
amount of land cleared. The government’s problem is given by: 
(13)  max ( , ) (1 ) (0, ) ( , , , ; , ) ( )
GR R P
R R RZ r R           HH w H , 
Similar to the landowner’s problem, there is a probability, 1-, where the road network project 
may not proceed. The first order condition that maximizes the government’s welfare is,   12
(14) ( ( , ) ( , )) ( ) 0
R
RR RG R r      .         
Here the expected marginal returns to the rural economy from road building are equal to the 
marginal cost of road building.  
We derive a demand equation for road building from (14), 
(15)  R = R (Z,w,H; ,) .                       
The direct effect of corruption control and political stability on road building is derived using the 
implicit function theorem on (14), 
(16) 
(, )













;           
(17) 
(, ) (, )












.             
The denominators of (16) and (17) are negative to ensure a maximum. More political stability 
increases road building only if the marginal returns of road building in the rest of the rural 
economy outweighs that of the agricultural sector, i.e. GR(R, ) < 
R
R(R,). The effect of 
corruption control on road building is ambiguous. If corruption control has a smaller effect on 
reducing the cost of infrastructure compared to its effect on the marginal productivity of roads, 
then we expect that an increase in corruption control decreases road building.  
Total Effect of Corruption Control and Political Stability  
To derive the total effect of corruption and political stability on road networks and 
agricultural land expansion, we apply Cramer’s Rule to (9) and (14), 
(18)  2 22
( ) ( ( ,) ( 0 ,) ) ( )
(, ) ( )( 1 ) ( 0 , ) ( )
RR
RR RR Z Z R R RZ
RR
ZZ R RR R Z Z R RR R R Z
GG R G c G G dZ
dG R G GG G
 
   
     

    


;     
(19)  
2 22
( ) ( ,) ( 1 ) ( 0 ,) ( ( ,) ( 0 ,) )
(, ) ( )( 1 ) ( 0 , ) ( )
R
RR Z Z Z Z R Z Z Z
RR
ZZ RR RR ZZ RR RR RZ
GG RG G G R G c dR
dG R G G G G
  
   
      

    
  

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The denominators of (18) and (19) are positive to ensure a maximum. The primary factor 
determining the effect of political stability is the effect of political stability on the marginal cost 
of land clearing, c. If c > 0, an increase in political stability would decrease land clearing and 
increase road building in the rural economy. However, the total effect of political stability on 
road building and land clearing is ambiguous when c < 0. 
The effects of corruption control on Z and R are also ambiguous. Using Cramer’s rule on 
(9) and (14) we find the following, 
(20)  2
() ( ( , ) ( 1 ) ( 0 , ) ) ( )
(, ) ( )( 1 ) ( 0 , ) ( )
R
RR RR Z Z RZ R
RR
ZZR R R R Z Z R R R R R Z
GG R G G G r dZ
dG R G G G G
    
  
     

    


;       
(21)  2 22
( ( ,) ( 1 ) ( 0 ,) ) ( ) ( ( ,) ( 1 ) ( 0 ,) )
(, ) ( )( 1 ) ( 0 , ) ( )
ZZ ZZ R RZ Z Z
RR
ZZ RR RR ZZ RR RR RZ
GR G G r G GR G dR
dG R G G GG
      
   
     

    
 

.          
The denominators of (20) and (21) are positive to ensure a maximum. The substitutability or 
complementarity of land and technology in the agricultural sector and the marginal effect of 
corruption control on the cost of infrastructure determine the sign of the two comparative statics. 
More corruption control can lead to increased (decreased) land clearing and decreased 
(increased) road building when technology and land are complements (substitutes) and the effect 
of corruption control on the cost of infrastructure is low (high). 
Empirical Model 
We postulate that the vector H is composed of trade policies (T), foreign direct 
investment levels (F) and average economic income (I). Melitz (2003) shows that exposure to 
trade induces unproductive firms to exit the market, more productive firms to continue to 
produce in the domestic market and most productive firms to enter the export market. Foreign 
direct investment has also been shown to positively affect total factor productivity (Woo 2009).   14
Lastly, economic growth, especially urban growth, can also have a positive effect on productivity 
in the agricultural sector (Gardner 2005).  
  We also include a measure of domestically competitive output price in our land clearing 
equation. Output price in the rural sector is likely to depend on the competitive world price along 
with a price adjustment reflecting road network availability. We also include a measure of 
infrastructure cost in the road building equation. 
We specify an empirical model to estimate the impact of governance on two direct factors 
of deforestation: road building and land clearing for cropland expansion. The empirical model 
specification is derived using equations (10) and (15) along with the above considerations, 
(22)  01 , 12 3 4 5 6 7 ln ln ln ln ln ln ln ln it i t it it it it it it i t it ZR Y p F T                       ;       
(23)  01 , 12 3 4 5 6 7 ln ln ln ln ln ln ln ln it i t it it it it it it i t it RZ Y r F T                                    
where subscript i and t represents country and time, respectively and j and j (j=0,..,7) are fixed 
parameters. Here, Zit is area of forest land cleared for agricultural purposes in country i at year t; 
Rit is length of road networks the rural sector; Yit is gross domestic product per capita; Tit is an 
index of trade policy openness; Fit is foreign direct investment;   it p is the crop price index of 
output from cleared land;  it r  is the cost of road infrastructure; it is a measure of corruption 
control; it is a measure of political stability; i and i are country effects which can be fixed or 
random, t and t are time effects common to all countries, and it and it are disturbance.      
Several important comments regarding the estimation of (22) and (23) are in order. 
International shocks that may be common to all countries in our sample may significantly affect 
road infrastructure project decisions as well as crop production. We account for this possibility 
by including time dummies for each year.    15
There may also be unobserved country characteristics such as weather, topography and 
land quality that affect the dependent variables. Exclusion of these variables could result in 
omitted variable bias. We include country fixed effects or random effects in our estimation. The 
underlying assumption in the Fixed Effects model allows endogeneity in all regressors and 
individual effects while in the Random Effects Model exogeneity is assumed. Alternatively, we 
relax the all or nothing choice of endogeneity with regressors by estimating a Hausman Taylor 
Random Effects (HTRE) model that assumes some of the regressors are correlated with the 
individual effects in the regressions.  
Lastly, the impact of road networks on agricultural crop production into forested areas 
may not occur instantaneously. For this reason, road networks are lagged in the agricultural land 
expansion equation (22). Similarly, the expansion of agricultural crop production into forested 
areas may not immediately induce an increase in the rural road network. Thus, we also use 
lagged agricultural land expansion in the road networks equation (23). Given the lagged 
specification, autocorrelation may be present in both equations. We use the Huber-White 
estimate to calculate a robust standard error. 
We calculate the short-run and long-run elasticities of forest cover from political stability 
and corruption control through the two direct factors of deforestation. The direct effects showing 
the short-run elasticities of corruption control and political stability on agricultural land 
expansion and road building are equal to α6 and α7, and β6 and β7, respectively.  
In the long run, the effect of variables in time t are the same as in time t-1. To derive the 
long-run elasticities of corruption control on agricultural land expansion and rural road building, 
we totally differentiate (22) and (23) with respect to lnφ, lnZ and lnR,









     
        
 . 
A similar method is used to determine the long-run elasticity of political stability on the two 
direct factors of deforestation. The resulting long-run elasticities of corruption control and 


























































.               
The above empirical methodology describes the calculation of short-run and long-run 
elasticities of governance indicators on the direct factors of deforestation, which constitutes 
estimation of Block 1 in our conceptual framework. We use estimates from existing microstudies 
that derive the elasticities of road building and land clearing on forest cover as shown in Block 2 
of the framework. The total effect of governance on forest cover is derived by combining the 
results from Block 1 and Block 2. Thus, the short-run effects of corruption control and political 
liability on forest cover are, 
(26)  66
SF F
FZ R E     ,   77
SF F
FZ R E     ,                  
where E
S
Fφ is the total short-run elasticity of corruption control on forest cover, E
S
Fλ is the total 
short-run elasticity of political stability on forest cover, 
F
Z  is the short-run elasticity of 
agricultural land expansion on forest cover and 
F
R   is the short-run elasticity of rural roads on 
forest cover. We also derive the long-run effects of the measures of governance on forest cover, 
(27) 
L ZF RF
FZ R E      ,  
L ZF RF
FZ R E                          17
where E
L
Fφ is the total long-run elasticity of corruption control on forest cover, E
L
Fλ is the total 
long-run elasticity of political stability on forest cover, 
F
Z  is the long-run elasticity of 
agricultural land expansion on forest cover and 
F
R   is the long-run elasticity of rural roads on 
forest cover.  
III. DATA 
We compile a unique cross-country dataset. Countries were selected based on the 
methodology of López et al. (2002) where developing countries with significant forest cover are 
identified based on the amount of absolute and relative forest land area. Furthermore, we focused 
only on those countries with agricultural crops that encroach on forest land, which narrows down 
our sample to countries in Latin America and Asia. There is evidence of tropical deforestation in 
Latin America due to slash and burn agriculture and pasture conversion practices (Houghton et 
al. 1991); and due to shifting cultivation in mountainous regions in Asia, especially in Southeast 
Asian countries (Rerkasem et al. 2009).  African countries were excluded in the study because 
deforestation is mainly driven by the collection and consumption of fuelwood (Anderson and 
Fishwick 1984; Allen and Barnes 1985; Armitage and Schramm 1989; Cline-Cole et al. 1990; 
Ribot 1999).  Developing countries in Europe and developed countries were likewise excluded 
since the major cause of deforestation is land clearing for urban developments (EEA 2006). 
There are twenty-two countries in our sample with data from 1990 to 2003. Appendix 1 lists 
these countries and identifies crops that encroach on forest land. 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics from our sample.  The key variables in our study 
are agricultural cropland encroaching on forest cover, crop price index, road and governance 
indicators. We calculated our own measure of cropland expansion by identifying crops 
encroaching on forested areas for each country in our sample. The selection of crops is based on   18
available reports and studies about the country’s food/cash crops and forest resources.
4  We add 
the total amount of harvested land area for each crop using data from FAOSTAT in each 
country. The creation of this unique and detailed variable allows us to obtain a more accurate 
estimate of the impact of agricultural land expansion on forest cover. If total agricultural land 
area is used, we could overestimate the effect of agricultural crop expansion on forest cover. We 
also calculate the crop price index from our selected crops using the Laspeyres index formula.  
We used unpaved road length in kilometers from the World Development Indicators. It is 
a common type of infrastructure that connects agricultural land and forest land and precedes any 
paved road construction between the two areas.   
The proxies for political stability and corruption control are government stability and 
corruption indices, respectively, which are obtained from the International Country Risk Guide 
published by the Political Risk Services Group.  Government stability is composed of 
government unity, legislative strength and popular support. This indicator assesses the 
government’s ability to implement its programs and to stay in office which captures the essence 
of our measure of political stability, λ. The total government stability rating ranges from 0 to 12 
where a score of zero equates to low government stability.  The second governance indicator is 
corruption within the political system, characterized by two main forms: financial corruption 
such as bribes for police protection, tax assessments, export/import licenses or loans; and 
insidious forms of corruption such as nepotism, job reservations, favor-for-favors and secret 
party funding. This proxy measure captures our corruption control index. The score of the 
corruption index ranges between 0 and 6, where zero denotes low corruption control.  From our 
country sample, the political stability indicator scores between 3 and 11, and averages about 7.5 
while the corruption control index has a score between 1 and 5 and an average of about 3.      19
Other variables used in our economic model are the gross domestic product per capita 
(GDP) in constant 2000 US$, foreign direct investment (FDI) as a percent of GDP, price of 
investment and trade openness index.  Data for GDP and FDI were obtained from the World 
Development Indicators and investment price is from Penn World Tables.  The trade openness 
index is derived from estimations by López et al. (2002) where they estimate a measure of trade 
policy openness instead of the usual trade volume measure. More (less) open countries have 
higher (lower) index values. Appendix 2 presents the definitions and data sources of all variables 
in the study.    
IV. EMPIRICAL ESTIMATES 
We present the regressions result relating the effects of governance on cropland 
expansion into forest areas and unpaved road development in the subsection below. Next, we 
combine the parameter estimates of our regressions with coefficients from other studies in the 
literature that measures the effect of direct factors of deforestation on forest cover.  
Underlying Factors and Direct Factors of Deforestation 
Tables 2 and 3 present the coefficient estimates of the determinants of two direct factors 
of deforestation: cropland expansion and unpaved road development based on (22) and (23). We 
calculated standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation using the Huber-White 
estimator. The goodness-of-fit of the model is satisfactory as shown by the adjusted R-squared 
and significant coefficients across various estimation procedures. 
Gross domestic product per capita has a consistently significant and large effect on 
unpaved road building and cropland expansion. We derive an elasticity of income per capita on 
cropland expansion ranging from 0.447 to 0.489 when controlling for country effects. The 
average growth rate of GDP per capita in our sample of countries is approximately 2.3%. Thus,   20
given this growth rate, there is an increase in demand for agricultural land of about 1%. The 
elasticity of income per capita on unpaved roads is more elastic with values ranging from -1.198 
to -1.683.  The negative value indicates that unpaved roads may be inferior infrastructure goods 
relative to paved roads which are likely to be normal infrastructure goods. Given an average 
growth of GDP per capita equal to 2.3%, we find a decrease in unpaved road building of 2.7%.  
The effect of lagged unpaved roads in the crop area regressions and the effect of lagged 
crop area expansion on unpaved road networks are both positive and significant. This result 
lends some support to our conceptual framework that road building and cropland expansion have 
a complementary relationship in the production of agricultural crops in the rural sector.  
The effects of our governance variables on cropland expansion are significant and 
consistent across various specifications.
5 Corruption control has a consistent positive impact on 
crop area expansion with the exception of the OLS estimate which is likely to be biased. Our 
theoretical model explains this result. If corruption control induces technological development 
and if technological progress and land use are complements in the production of agricultural 
output, then corruption control could lead to agricultural extensification. On the other hand, we 
find a consistent negative and significant relationship between our political stability variable and 
crop area expansion, with the exception of our OLS estimates. Based on our theoretical model, 
this could be attributed to the rise in the cost of land clearing due to the creation and enforcement 
of policies protecting forest land. The sign of the governance variables are insignificant in the 
unpaved road regressions in all model specifications that control for country effects. 
In order to calculate the total effect of our governance variables on forest cover, we select 
a benchmark model. We can use any of the estimates that allow for heterogeneous country 
characteristics as a benchmark. Here, we use the random effects estimates as benchmarks for the   21
calculating the short-run and long-run effect of governance on forest cover since the Hausman 
test fails to reject the null hypothesis that the regressors are not correlated with the error term. 
The short-run and long-run elasticities of governance are calculated using parameters 
from the random effects model. We use equations (24) and (25) to derive the long-run parameter 
estimates and we use the delta method to derive a measure of the standard errors. Table 4 
summarizes the short-run and long-run elasticities of our measures of governance on two 
channels of deforestation: crop area expansion and unpaved roads. These results indicate that 
corruption control and political stability have a significant effect on crop area expansion but they 
are not significant on unpaved roads. The positive influence of corruption control on crop land 
expansion is similar to the results derived by Bulte et al. (2007). They find theoretically that 
governments prone to accept bribes in exchange for favorable policies (low corruption control) 
cause farmers to adopt inefficient modes of production (low technological quality). To the extent 
that low technological quality complements land use, then a decline in corruption control could 
lead to a reduction in crop area expansion. The negative effect of political stability on crop 
production is also consistent with the estimates from Lio and Hu (2009) where they find political 
stability leads to a reduction in agricultural efficiency. The long run and short run elasticities of 
corruption control and political stability are not statistically different from each other.  
We also derive the long-run and short-run elasticities of GDP per capita and foreign 
direct investment on the direct factors of deforestation. GDP per capita has a significant positive 
effect on crop area but a negative effect on unpaved roads. The results are similar to López and 
Galinato (2005) for the crop area elasticity but the sign is different for roads. The differences in 
sign may be attributed to our use of unpaved road data, presumably an inferior good, while 
López and Galinato used paved road data, a normal good. Foreign direct investment has a   22
negative effect on crop area expansion but positive effect on unpaved road construction which 
may indicate that investments are targeted towards non-agricultural activities. The short-run and 
long run effects of both variables are not statistically different from each other.  
The Total Effect of Macroeconomic Variables on Forest Cover 
We combine the parameters estimated from our regressions with coefficient estimates 
from other studies that utilize individual country survey statistics, remote sensing or GIS data to 
analyze the effect of direct factors on deforestation. We consider those micro studies that derived 
the long-run and short-run effects of forest competing crop area and roads. Given this set of 
micro studies, there are only a few studies that are most suited for our purposes based on 
location, methodological estimation, availability of descriptive statistics to compute implied 
standard errors and compatibility with our own parameter estimates. 
  In order to make our estimates more comparable with the parameter estimates of micro 
studies derived from different countries, we adjust the elasticity of the direct factors on forest 
cover. First, we use the implied marginal effects from the studies we selected. Then we calculate 
the elasticities of the direct factors on forest cover using the implied marginal effects along with 
the average forest cover, average unpaved road levels and average crop area in our sample.  
  The long-run and short-run effects of crop area on forest cover were taken from two 
studies. López (2000) estimated the effect of cultivation on forest clearing in rural villages in 
Western Ivory Coast.  He shows that a one hectare increase in area cultivated results in 4.4 
hectare decrease in forest cover. This marginal effect is larger than one because the conversion of 
forest cover to agricultural land also requires additional clearing for human settlement, 
infrastructure and other related activities supporting agricultural production. The implied   23
marginal effect of crop area on forest cover in the Ivory Coast is remarkably similar to those 
derived by Osgood (1994) in Indonesia (4.25) and López (1997) in Ghana (3.9).
6  
We also use estimates from Maertens et al. (2006) to derive the long-run effect of shifting 
cultivation on forest cover. Their study focused on the long-run effect of shifting cultivation in 
Indonesia from 1980-2001. They arrive at an implied marginal effect of -0.88. The marginal 
effect is less than one in the long run possibly because abandoning the area could have led to re-
growth of natural forest vegetation. Alternatively, some of the competing agricultural crops 
(rubber, palm oil and coconut) could also have been counted as secondary forest cover.  
Panayotou and Sungsuwan (1994) measure the effect of road networks on forest cover in 
Thailand. They arrive at an implicit marginal effect -0.27 which means that a one kilometer (km) 
increase in road networks decreases forest cover by 0.27 km
2. Unfortunately, we were not able to 
find any studies that estimated the long-run effects of road networks on forest cover. However, 
we were able to find a study by McGuirk and Mundlak (1992) that estimated the long-run and 
short-run elasticities of the effect of roads on agricultural areas in India. They find that an 
increase in road networks by 1 kilometer increases agricultural land area by 0.0005 km
2 in the 
short run and 0.025 km
2 in the long run. If we assume that the new agricultural land that is 
created encroaches on forest cover, then we can derive the marginal effect of roads on forest 
cover by multiplying marginal agricultural land by the marginal crop area measure of forest 
cover from López (2000) of -4.4. The implied marginal effect of roads on forest cover is -0.002 
km
2 in the short run and -0.11 in the long run. The larger long-run marginal effect of roads on 
forest cover can be attributed to the proliferation of other related human activity after the initial 
influx due to agricultural land expansion. Table 5 summarizes the elasticities of the direct factors   24
affecting forest cover calculated from estimates in the micro studies. Given the non-linearity of 
the parameter estimates, we use the delta method to calculate the standard errors.  
We use the elasticities derived from Table 4 and combine them with our elasticities in 
Table 5 to arrive at the total effect of governance, GDP per capita and foreign direct investment 
on forest cover using equations (26) and (27). Results are summarized in Table 6. The column 
labeled Crop Area Channel shows the net elasticity of our measures of governance on forest 
cover through the crop area channel only. There are two columns representing the effect of 
governance on forest cover through road networks. Road Channel I and Total Effect I uses the 
coefficient estimates from Panayotou and Sungsuwan for both the short-run and long-run 
estimates while the row labeled Road Channel II and Total Effect II uses estimates from 
McGuirk and Mundlak.  
  The elasticities of both our measures of governance on forest cover through the roads 
channel are consistently insignificant in both the short run and long run. In contrast, the effect of 
governance on forest cover through the cropland expansion channel is significant. Political 
stability decreases crop coverage which would result in an increase in forest cover in both the 
short run and long run with a larger statistically significant magnitude in the former. On the other 
hand, corruption control increases cropland expansion which leads to a decrease in forest cover 
in the short run and the long run with a statistically significant larger effect in the former. The 
total effect is dominated by the cropland expansion channel while the road channel is 
insignificant.  
In order to derive a clear picture of the effect of our governance variables on forest cover, 
we simulate the effect of corruption control and political stability for Brazil and Indonesia. The 
country with the highest measure of corruption control in our sample is Costa Rica. If the   25
corruption control level of Brazil and Indonesia improved to the same stringency as Costa Rica, 
we estimate a 2% and 6% decrease in forest cover from agricultural land expansion in the short 
run, respectively. The most politically stable country in our sample is China. If Brazil and 
Indonesia improved government stability similar to the levels in China, we estimate an increase 
in forest cover by 2.3% and 1.6%, respectively, in the short run. There is also a consistent 
positive impact in the long run for the Brazil and Indonesia in the order of 0.4% and 0.2%, 
respectively. 
Our empirical results showing a positive relationship between political stability and forest 
cover is also supported by Barbier (2004) but the negative relationship between corruption 
control and forest cover is contrary to the results of other models in the literature. Barbier (2004) 
and Bulte et al. (2007) use total agricultural land area from the FAO as proxies for cropland 
expansion and find that increased corruption control reduces agricultural land expansion. We can 
attribute the differences in empirical results to differences in the dependent variable. We refine 
our measure of cropland expansion to include only the agricultural land from crops that expand 
into forests and not all crop types. Thus, we may be obtaining a more precise estimate regarding 
the correlation between corruption control to cropland infringing on forest land only.  
GDP per capita significantly affects forest cover through the cropland and road network 
channels. We find that the negative effect through the cropland channel is larger than the roads 
channel positive effect in the short run which leads to an overall decrease in forest cover as the 
economy grows. The average economic growth in Latin America over our sample countries is 
1.61% while it is 3.27% in Asia. This growth would lead to a decrease in forest cover of about 
0.17% and 0.34% in Latin America and Asia, respectively, in the short run. The actual rates of 
deforestation in Latin America and Asia are higher at an annual percentage change of 0.6% and   26
0.7%, respectively. Thus, income growth explains less than half of deforestation. The impact of 
other policies such as governance, trade and foreign direct investment may explain other sources 
of deforestation. In the long run, the positive effect of GDP per capita through road networks 
outweighs the negative effect through cropland resulting in an insignificant effect of economic 
growth. Thus, we do not find any persistent effect of GDP in the long run.  
Foreign direct investment has a significant positive impact on forest cover in the short run 
because the positive effect through the cropland channel outweighs the negative effect through 
the road channel. This seems to indicate that investment is non-agricultural-oriented and could 
actually alleviate pressure on forest cover by allowing the urban sector to grow, thus putting less 
pressure on the rural sector. This particular result is different from López and Galinato (2005) 
wherein they find an insignificant effect of foreign direct investment on forest cover with the 
four countries in their sample. There is no significant effect of FDI on forest land in the long run. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This article investigated the effect of two governance indicators: corruption control and 
political stability on forest cover through agricultural expansion and road building. The main 
contributions of the article are: (1) the theoretical identification of the potential mechanisms by 
which the governance affects forest cover; and (2) the empirical structural measure of the effect 
of governance and other economy-wide variables on deforestation in the short run and long run. 
Using this approach as opposed to reduced form estimates allows us to identify the channels by 
which economy-wide variables affect forest cover. 
  The theoretical model shows the importance of the complementarity or substitutability of 
technology and land use in understanding how corruption control affects the agricultural land   27
expansion choice. The primary factor determining the effect of political stability on agricultural 
land expansion is the effect of political stability on the marginal cost of land clearing.  
  We build a unique dataset to isolate agricultural land that encroaches on forest cover. The 
empirical results show that corruption control significantly decreases forest cover through the 
agricultural land expansion channel and the effect is larger in the short run than the long run. 
This particular result is counter to the results of other studies that estimate a reduced form model. 
There are two potential reasons why we achieve such diverging results. First, we construct our 
own measure of agricultural land by isolating only crops that we identify as forest encroaching 
instead of using aggregate agricultural land values. Second, we identify specific channels where 
corruption control affects forest cover. Similar to other studies in the literature, we also find that 
political stability has a positive and significant effect on forest cover because of a reduction in 
cropland encroachment. Unlike other studies, we are able to identify a lingering effect of 
political stability on forest cover in the long run. 
  We also find that GDP per capita has a strong negative effect on forest cover. The large 
negative effect is primarily due to the agricultural land expansion channel – an increase in 
income per capita leads to an increase in demand for cropland, thus, decreasing forest cover. This 
effect outweighs the positive effect through a reduction in road building. Although large, GDP 
per capita explains less than half of deforestation in our sample of countries. Other factors such 
as governance and other macroeconomic policies may also contribute significantly in explaining 
deforestation. Interestingly, unlike the governance indicators, GDP per capita does not have a 
lingering effect and is insignificant in the long run. Measures of governance may be an indication 
of an underlying structural infrastructure that has short-run and long-run effects while GDP per 
capita is only a short-run indicator.   28
  The effects of foreign direct investment and trade are not as robust. López and Galinato 
(2005) found a robust negative effect of trade openness using four sample countries: Brazil, 
Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. However, our estimates are insignificant over a larger 
sample of countries. This may indicate that not all countries, especially countries that are not 
necessarily agriculturally dependent, are likely to have forest covers sensitive to trade levels. 
  One limitation of this study is that the focus is only on deforestation caused by cropland 
expansion. A future study may examine the effects on deforestation through logging and rural 
poverty.   29
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Tables 
TABLE 1 
SUMMARY STATISTICS OF VARIABLES 
Variable Mean Std.  Dev. Min Max 
   
Crop, area harvested (ha)  761,937.64 10.28 2,000.00 39,624,968.69 
GDP per capita ($)  1,477.85 2.29 270.40 5,934.99 
Crop price index  1.10 5.81 0.02 9,207.08 
Foreign direct investment  2.64 2.37 -2.76 12.88 
Political stability index  7.53 2.01 3.00 11.00 
Corruption control index  2.91 0.92 1.00 5.00 
Trade openness  0.85 33.42 -57.64 162.67 
Unpaved road (km)  56,261.18 4.98 861.05 1,795,851.79 




DETERMINANTS OF CROPLAND AREA IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 1990-2003 
Variables OLS   TWFE   RE      HTRE  
Lag of log unpaved roads  0.885*** 0.131***  0.156 ***  0.136*** 
 (0.068)  (0.017)  (0.033)    (0.032) 
Log of GDP per capita   1.145*** 0.447**  0.489 ***  0.469*** 
 (0.147)  (0.237)  (0.156)    (0.153) 
Log of crop price index  0.237*** 0.008  0.007   0.007 
 (0.021)  (0.005)  (0.005)    (0.007) 
Foreign direct investment over GDP -0.153*** -0.008  -0.008 *  -0.008* 
 (0.064)  (0.007)  (0.005)    (0.005) 
Corruption control  -0.935*** 0.064**  0.060 ***  0.063*** 
 (0.149)  (0.036)  (0.023)    (0.020) 
Political stability  0.324*** -0.018**  -0.017 ***  -0.018*** 
 (0.070)  (0.010)  (0.009)    (0.008) 
Index of trade openness  0.020*** 0.0003  0.0004   0.0003 
 (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.001)    (0.001) 
Constant -4.949*** 8.985***  8.501  *  8.375*** 
   (1.475)   (1.878)   (1.261)    (1.498)  
R-squared 0.627  0.181  0.205    0.331 
Number of observations  227  227  227   227 
Annual dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes 
Hausman test (prob Chi-squared)      (-)   (-) 
Note: Robust standard errors.  
*** 5%, **10%, *15% 
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TABLE 3 
DETERMINANTS OF UNPAVED ROADS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 1990-2003 
Variables OLS TWFE RE    HTRE
Lag of log crop land  0.502***  0.694*  0.582 ***  0.642***
 (0.042)  (0.463)  (0.138)    (0.104) 
Log of GDP per capita  -0.776***  -1.683**  -1.198 ***  -1.531***
 (0.144)  (0.937)  (0.337)    (0.273) 
Log of investment price index  0.475  0.007  0.010   0.001 
 (0.458)  (0.150)  (0.095)    (0.124) 
Foreign direct investment over GDP -0.052*  0.026***  0.027 ***  0.026***
 (0.035)  (0.010)  (0.009)    (0.010) 
Corruption control  0.333***  -0.017  -0.013   -0.014 
 (0.096)  (0.051)  (0.038)    (0.037) 
Political stability  -0.070  0.018  0.011   0.016 
 (0.057)  (0.019)  (0.013)    (0.015) 
Index of trade openness  -0.011***  -0.001  -0.001   -0.001 
 (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)    (0.002) 
Constant 7.139***  13.598***  11.572  ***  12.374***
 (1.415)  (3.904)  (2.009)    (2.177) 
R-squared 0.497  0.362  0.382    0.399 
Number of observations  251  251  251   251 
Annual dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes 
Hausman test (prob Chi-square)      0.997   1.000 
Note: Robust standard errors.  
*** 5%, **10%, *15% 
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TABLE 4. 
SHORT-RUN VERSUS LONG-RUN ELASTICITY OF GOVERNANCE ON THE DIRECT FACTORS OF 
DEFORESTATION 
  Elasticity on Crop Area  Elasticity on Unpaved Roads 
Short run
1    

















2    
















1 Short-run elasticities are derived using parameters from the random effects models. The coefficients in 
Tables 1 and 2 reflect the percentage change of the direct factor of deforestation given a unit change in 
the governance variable. In order to convert this to the appropriate elasticity measure, we use the formula 
αX where α is the parameter estimate and X is the mean value of the governance indicator. The standard 
error is equal to s(α)X where s(α) is the standard error of the parameter. 
2 Long-run elasticities are calculated using parameters from the random effects models in Tables 1 and 2 
using equations (24) and (25). Asymptotically, the variance of a nonlinear univariate function, g(A), is 













g A V A
g A g V
T
) ( )) ( (  where g/A is a vector whose i
th element is the partial 
derivative of g with respect to the i
th element A, and V(A) is the variance-covariance matrix of the 
parameters in the vector A.   36
TABLE 5 
IMPLIED DIRECT EFFECT ELASTICITIES ON FOREST COVER FROM MICRO STUDIES 
Direct Effects  Short-run elasticities Long-run  elasticities 






















*** 5%, **10%, *15% 
1 The short-run elasticity is derived by multiplying the marginal effect from López (2000) of -4.4 by the 
ratio of crop area to forest cover from the sample in the data (41,478/683,676). The long-run elasticity is 
derived by multiplying the marginal effect from Maertens et al. (2006) of -0.88 by the same ratio. 
2 The short-run elasticity is derived by multiplying the marginal effect from Panayotou and Sungsuwan 
(1994) of -0.27 by the ratio of road density to forest cover from the sample of countries in the data 
(56,790/683,676). 
 
3 The short-run elasticity is derived by multiplying the marginal effect of agricultural land from McGuirk 
and Mundlak (1992) of 0.000514 with López’s estimate of -4.4 and the ratio of road density to forest 
cover from the sample of countries in the data (56,790/683,676). The long-run elasticity is measured in a 
similar manner but a marginal effect of agricultural land equal from McGuirk and Mundlak (1992) of 
0.0258585 is used. 
 
TABLE 6 
SHORT-RUN VERSUS LONG-RUN ELASTICITY OF GOVERNANCE ON FOREST COVER 
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*** 5%, **10%, *15% 
1 Coefficient estimates from Panayotou and Sungsuwan (1994) are used. 




LINKING DEFORESTATION TO GOVERNANCE 
 
FIGURE 2 
COUNTRY DOMINANCE CHECK IN CROP LAND RANDOM EFFECTS MODEL 
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APPENDIX 1 
LIST OF COUNTRIES AND AGRICULTURAL CROPS ENCROACHING ON FOREST LAND 
Country  Crop/s  Source/s 
Bangladesh  Oilseeds, rubber, cotton  Golam Rasul. 2007. “Political Ecology of Degradation of Forest Common in 
the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh.” Environmental Conservation 34 
(2): 153–163. 
Bolivia  Quinoa, fava bean, maize, maize green, 
potato, barley, soybeans 
Bluffstone, R., M. Boscolo and R. Molina. 2002. “How does community 
forestry affect rural households: A labor allocation model of the Bolivian 
Andes.”  See Table 6. Available from: 
http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/handle/10535/985 
 
World Rainforest Movement. 2004. “The Focus of this Issue: The Role of 
Agriculture and Cattle Raising in Deforestation.” Issue Number 85. Available 
from: http://www.wrm.org.uy/bulletin/85/viewpoint.html. 
Brazil  Banana, coffee, maize, rice, soybeans, 
cassava/tapioca, beans (including cowpeas 
and other types) 
López, R. and G. I. Galinato. 2005. “Trade Policies, Economic Growth, and 
the Direct Causes of Deforestation.” Land Economics 81 (2): 145-169. 
 
Simon, M.F. and F.L. Garagorry. 2005. "The expansion of agriculture in the 
Brazilian Amazon." Environmental Conservation 32 (3): 203–212. 
China  Soybeans  World Rainforest Movement. 2004. “The Focus of this Issue: The Role of 
Agriculture and  Cattle Raising in Deforestation.” Issue Number 85. 
Available from: http://www.wrm.org.uy/bulletin/85/viewpoint.html. 
Colombia  Banana, arrowleaf, new cocoyam, maize, 
pineapple, sugar cane, cassava/manioc 
Eden, M.J. and A. Andrade. 1988. "Colonos, Agriculture and Adaptation in 
the Colombian Amazon." Journal of Biogeography 15(1): 79-85. 
Costa Rica  Banana, mango  Christian, S. 1992. "There's a Bonanza in Nature for Costa Rica, but Its 
Forests Too Are Besieged."  The New York Times.  Available from: 
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/05/29/world/there-s-a-bonanza-in-nature-for-
costa-rica-but-its-forests-too-are-besieged.html. 
Dominican Republic  Coffee, corn  Rosa, H. 2004. “Economic Integration and the Environment in El Salvador.” 
Working Group on Development and Environment in the Americas, 
Discussion Paper No. 7. Available from: 
http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/pubs/rp/DP07RosaJuly04.pdf. 
Ecuador  Cacao, coffee, manioc/cassava, naranjilla, 
tea, palm oil, rice, maize 
Schaller et al.  no date.  “Indigenous Ecotourism and Sustainable 
Development: The Case of Río Blanco, Ecuador.” 
http://www.eduweb.com/schaller/Section1RioBlanco1.html 
Honduras  Beans, coffee, maize  Tucker, C.M., D.K. Munroe, H. Nagendra and J. Southworth. 2005.   39
Country  Crop/s  Source/s 
“Comparative Spatial Analyses of Forest Conservation and Change in 
Honduras and Guatemala.” Conservation and Society 3(1): 174 - 200. 
India  Soybeans  World Rainforest Movement. 2004. “The Focus of this Issue: The Role of 
Agriculture and  Cattle Raising in Deforestation.” Issue Number 85. 
Available from: http://www.wrm.org.uy/bulletin/85/viewpoint.html. 
Indonesia  Coconut, rubber, palm oil  López, R. and G. I. Galinato. 2005. “Trade Policies, Economic Growth, and 
the Direct Causes of Deforestation.” Land Economics 81(2): 145-169. 
 
World Rainforest Movement. 2004. “The Focus of this Issue: The Role of 
Agriculture and  Cattle Raising in Deforestation.” Issue Number 85. 
Available from: http://www.wrm.org.uy/bulletin/85/viewpoint.html. 
Iran, Islamic Rep.  Wheat  Subregional report of the Forestry Outlook Study for West and Central Asia. 
Available from: ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/010/k1652e/k1652e03.pdf. 
Malaysia  Coconut, rubber, palm oil, rice  López, R. and G. I. Galinato. 2005. “Trade Policies, Economic Growth, and 
the Direct Causes of Deforestation.” Land Economics 81(2): 145-169. 
 
World Rainforest Movement. 2004. “The Focus of this Issue: The Role of 
Agriculture and  Cattle Raising in Deforestation.” Issue Number 85. 
Available from: http://www.wrm.org.uy/bulletin/85/viewpoint.html. 
Mexico  Maize, commercial chili  Deininger, K.W. and B. Minten. 1999. “Poverty, policies, and deforestation: 
The case of Mexico.” World Bank Research Paper. Available from: 
http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/resolve?EDCCv47p313PS. 
 
Turner, B. L., II, P.A. Matson, J.J. McCarthy, R.W. Corell, L.Christensen, N. 
Eckley, G. Hovelsrud-Broda, J.X. Kasperson, R.E. Kasperson, A. Luers, M.L. 
Martello, S. Mathiesen, R. Naylor, C. Polsky, A. Pulsipher, A. Schiller, H. 
Selin, and N. Tyler. 2003. “Illustrating the Coupled Human-Environment 
System for Vulnerability Analysis: Three Case Studies.” Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 100(14): 
8080-8085. Available from: 
http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/BCSIA/sust.nsf/pubs/pub83. 
Nicaragua  Palm fruit  From Meals to Wheels: The Social and Ecological Catastrophe of Biofuels. 
Available from: http://www.globaljusticeecology.org/files/GJEP-biofuels-
comp.pdf. 
Pakistan  Sugar cane  Abbas, M. , S.H. Khan, R.A. Khan and M. Shahbaz. 2004. “Impact of Wild   40
Country  Crop/s  Source/s 
Boar Habitat on Sugarcane Crop.” International Journal of Agriculture and 
Biology  6(2): 420-421. 
Panama  Coffee  Beatty, A. 2008. Gourmet Coffee Eats into Panama Forest. Reuters Article. 
Available from: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/environmentNews/idUSN2233936820080723. 
Peru  Cassava/tapioca, peach palm, maize, 
plantains, rice 
Staver, C., R. Simeone and A. Stocks. 1994. “Land Resource Management 
and Forest Conservation in Central Amazonian Peru: Regional, Community, 
and Farm-Level Approaches among Native Peoples.” Mountain Research and 
Development 14(2): 147-157. 
Philippines  Cassava, corn, rice, sweet potato  Honda, Y. 1997. “Philippine Sugar and Environment.” TED Case Studies No. 
250, American University. Available from: 
http://www.american.edu/TED/PHILSUG.HTM. 
 
López, R. and G. I. Galinato. 2005. “Trade Policies, Economic Growth, and 
the Direct Causes of Deforestation.” Land Economics 81(2): 145-169. 
Sri Lanka  Tobacco, banana, coconut, mango  C. Bogahawatte. 2003. “Forestry Policy, Non-Timber Forest Products and 
The Rural Economy In The Wet Zone in Sri Lanka.” Economy and 
Environment Program for Southeast Asia (EEPSEA) Research Report. 
Available from: http://ideas.repec.org/p/eep/report/rr1999122.html. 
Thailand  Cassava  P. Macek and K. Chareonying. 1997.  “Thailand's Logging Ban.” TED Case 
Studies No. 69, American University. Available from: 
http://www.american.edu/TED/THAILOG.HTM. 
Venezuela, RB  Banana, coffee, maize, tobacco, cassava, 
sugar cane, citrus fruit 
Allan, J. D.,  A. J. Brenner, J. Erazo, L. Fernandez, A. S. Flecker, D. L. 
Karwan, Samuel Segnini, D. C. Taphorn. 2002. “Land Use in Watersheds of 





Note: Agricultural crops encroaching on forest land refer to crops identified in studies that are planted along shifting agricultural 
frontiers converted from forest land. Given space limitations, we do not include here the citations from each individual study that 
helped us identify these crops. The citations are available from the authors on request. 
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APPENDIX 2 
DEFINITION AND SOURCES OF VARIABLES USED IN THE STUDY 
Variable Name  Definition  Source/s 
Crop, area harvested (ha)  Area harvested in hectares  Author’s calculation using 
data from FAOSTAT – 
Production.
a  
GDP per capita (constant 2000 $)  Gross domestic product 




Crop price index  Calculation is based on the 









t q t p
t q t p
P
c c
c n c  
where P is the change in price 
level, pc,t represents the 
prevailing price of crop c in 
period t, qc,t is the quantity 
of crop c sold in period t,  t0 
is the base period (year 
2000), and tn is the period 
for which the index is 
computed. 
Author’s calculation using 
data from FAOSTAT – 
Production (Crops) database 
and FAOSTAT - Production 
(PriceSTAT) database.
a  
Foreign direct investment  As percentage of GDP.  World Development 
Indicators
b  
Government Political stability 
index 
Assesses the government’s 
ability to implement its 
programs and to stay in 
office. 
The PRS Group, Inc.
c  
Corruption control index  An indicator of orruption 
within the political system, 
characterized by financial 
corruption and insidious  
corruption. 
The PRS Group, Inc.
c  
Trade openness  See source.  López et al. (2002) 





Price level of investment  Calculated as Purchasing 
Power Parity (PPP) over 
Investment divided by the 
exchange rate times 100. 
Penn World Tables
d 
a Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). 2009. FAOSTAT – 
Production (Crops) and Prices (PriceSTAT) databases. Available from: http://faostat.fao.org/. 
b World Bank. 2009. World Development Indicators. Washington, DC. 
c The PRS Group, Inc. 2009. International Country Risk Guide. Available from: 
http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG.aspx. 
d Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices (CIC). 2006. Penn 
World Tables 6.3. Available from: http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt63/pwt63_form.php.   42
                                                 
1 One important direct factor is logging. The fact that initial logging is usually followed by 
agricultural production especially in developing countries makes it difficult to separate the effect 
of logging and agricultural expansion. Our analysis of agricultural land expansion refers only to 
crop production and not livestock production because the mechanisms by which governance 
affects deforestation may differ between the two production technologies.  
2 From this point forward, our notation for the derivative and second derivative of function F(x) 
with respect to x is F/x  Fx and 
2F/x
2  Fxx. 
3 To avoid notation clutter, we drop the i and t subscripts since t=t-1 for all t.  
4 Due to space limitations, we do not include the full reference list for Appendix 1.  The list of 
sources identifying crops in each country is available from the authors upon request. 
5 To test for any effect of country outliers, we dropped country observations one at a time and 
checked whether the sign of coefficient estimates for corruption control and political stability 
changed in the cropland area random effects regression. There is no significant change in the 
coefficients for either parameter as shown in Figure 2. 
6 It was difficult to accurately calculate the standard errors from these two studies therefore we 
opted to use the coefficient estimates from the Ivory Coast.  